

# OBSERVATIONS

ON

41

*PAINÉ'S RIGHTS OF MAN,*

IN A

SERIES OF LETTERS,

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BY PUBLICOLA.

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*It is not a mechanical terror against the name of a King, or of aristocracy, nor a physical antipathy to the sound of an extravagant title, or to the sight of an innocent ribband, that can authorise a people to lay violent hands upon the Constitution.*

LETTER V.

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THIRD EDITION.

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RESERVATIONS

PRIME, RIGHTS OF MAN,

SERIES OF LETTERS

BY J. B. COLE



THE following Letters were originally published (Summer 1791) in a Boston Newspaper, called the *COLUMBIAN SENTINEL*, afterwards in the New York and other American papers. In America, they are generally ascribed to JOHN ADAMS\*, the present Vice-President of the American States.— They are now republished here, and recommended to the serious attention of those who, with Mr PAINE and others, think Revolutions in Government so easily effected.

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\* Mr ADAMS is a native of America, and received his education at the College of Cambridge in New England. He was bred to the Law at Boston, and his abilities soon raised him to the head of the profession. He was one of the Delegates to the first American Congress; and after the Declaration of Independence was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to the States of Holland. He was one of the Commissioners who signed the Peace between Great Britain and the American States at Paris in 1783. Soon after which, he was appointed Ambassador to the Court of Great Britain, where he resided several years, and, on his return to his native country, was chosen Vice-President of the American States under the Federal Government.

The following letters were originally published  
in the Boston Revue, called the  
Boston Revue, and were in the New  
England and other American papers. In America  
it is generally known to John Adams, the  
first President of the American Union—  
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## LETTER I.

MR. RUSSELL,

*Boston, 1791.*

S I R,

**T**HE late Revolution in France has opened an extensive field of speculation to the philosopher and to the politician. An event so astonishing and unexpected in its nature, and so important in its consequences, naturally arrested the peculiar attention of the whole civilized world. The friends of liberty, and of man, have seen with pleasure the temples of despotism levelled with the ground, and the Genius of Freedom, rising suddenly, in his collected and irresistible strength, and snapping in an instant all the cords with which for centuries he had been bound. Upon the downfall of the arbitrary system of government in France, there appears to have been but one sentiment, and that, a sentiment of exultation: But while the friends of humanity have rejoiced at the emancipation of so many millions of their fellow-creatures, they have waited with an anxious expectation to see upon what foundations they would attempt to establish their newly acquired liberty. The proceedings of their Representative Assembly have been contemplated in very different points of view, by men of names equally illustrious, and of characters equal-

ly favourable to the cause of liberty. Among the publications which have appeared upon the subject, two pamphlets, founded upon very different principles, appear to have been received with the greatest avidity, and seem calculated to leave the deepest impression. The one written by Mr. Burke, which is one continued invective upon almost all the proceedings of the National Assembly since the Revolution, and which passes a severe and indiscriminating censure upon almost all their transactions: the other, the production of Mr. Paine, containing a defence of the Assembly, and approving every thing they have done, with applause as undistinguishing as is the censure of Mr. Burke. We are told, that the copy from which an edition of this work was reprinted at Philadelphia, was furnished by the Secretary of State, and was accompanied by a letter, from which the following extract has been published in most of our newspapers. "I am extremely pleased to find that it is to be reprinted here, and that something is at length to be publicly said against the *political heresies* which have sprung up among us. I have no doubt our citizens will rally a second time round the standard of *Common Sense*."

I confess, Sir, I am somewhat at a loss to determine what this very respectable Gentleman means by *political heresies*. Does he consider this pamphlet of Mr. Paine's as the canonical book of political scripture? As containing the true doctrine of popular infallibility, from which it would be heretical to depart in one single point. The expressions indeed imply more; they seem, like the Arabian prophet, to call upon all true believers in the *Islam* of democracy, to draw their swords, and

in the fervour of their devotion, to compel all their countrymen to cry out, "There is but one God—defs of Liberty, and Common Sense is her prophet."

I have always understood, Sir, that the citizens of these States were possessed of a full and entire freedom of opinion upon all subjects, civil as well as religious; they have not yet established any infallible criterion of *orthodoxy*, either in church or state: Their principles in theory, and their habits in practice, are equally averse to that slavery of the mind, which adopts without examination any sentiment that has the sanction of a venerable name. "*Nullius in verba jurare magistri*" is their favourite maxim; and the only political tenet which they would stigmatize with the name of heresy, would be that which should attempt to impose an opinion upon their understandings, upon the single principle of authority.

I believe also, Sir, that the citizens of America are not at present disposed to rally round the standard of any man. In the full possession and enjoyment of all the freedom for which they have gone through so arduous a conflict, they will not for the poor purpose of extinguishing a few supposed political heresies, return to the horrors of a civil contest, from which they could reap no possible benefit, and which would probably terminate in the loss of that liberty, for which they have been so liberal of their treasure and of their blood.

If, however, Mr. Paine is to be adopted as the holy father of our political faith, and this pamphlet is to be considered as his Papal Bull of infallible virtue, let us at least examine what it contains. Before we determine to join the standard,



let us inquire what are the articles of war, to which our General requires our submission.—It is the glorious characteristic of truth, at once to invite and bid defiance to investigation. If any opinions which have sprung up among us have really led us astray from the standard of *truth*, let us return to it, at the call of Mr. Paine, or of any other man, who can shew us our errors. But, Sir, if, upon examination, even this testament of orthodoxy shall be found to contain many spurious texts, false in their principles, and delusive in their inferences, we may be permitted, notwithstanding our reverence for the author, at least to expunge the apocryphal doctrine, and to confine our faith to the genuine tenets of real political inspiration.—It is my intention to submit to the public a few observations which have occurred to me upon the perusal of this pamphlet, which has so clear and valid a title to the public attention.—But I must here observe, that I wish to avoid every appearance of disrespect, either to the real parent of this production, or to the gentleman who has stood its sponsor in this country. Both these gentlemen are entitled to the gratitude of their countrymen; the latter still renders important services, in a very dignified station. He is a friend to free inquiry upon every subject; and he will not be displeased to see the sentiments which he has made his own, by a public adoption, canvassed with as much freedom as is consistent with the reverence due to his character.

PUBLICOLA.



## LETTER II.

SIR,

IN that part of Mr. Paine's pamphlet which he has chosen to call the miscellaneous chapter, he observes, that, "when a man in a long cause attempts to steer his course by any thing else than some *polar truth or principle*, he is sure to be lost." I have sought for the polar principle to which his exertions were directed in this publication; and I must acknowledge I have sought in vain. His production is historical, political, miscellaneous, satirical and panegyrical. It is an encomium upon the National Assembly of France. It is a commentary upon the rights of men, inferring questionable deductions from unquestionable principles. It is a severe satire upon Mr. Burke and his pamphlet upon the English Government, upon Kings, upon Nobility, and Aristocracy. It is a narrative of several occurrences, connected with the French Revolution, and it concludes with a kind of prophetic impulse, in the expectations of an "*European Congress to patronize the progress of free government, and promote the civilization of nations with each other.*" The object which he promised to himself in this publication, is not so dubious as the principle on which he wrote. His intention appears evidently to be, to convince the people of Great Britain, that they have neither Liberty nor a Constitution—that their only possible means to produce these blessings to themselves, is, to "topple-down headlong" their present government, and

follow implicitly the example of the French. As to the right, he scruples not to say, "that which a whole nation chooses to do, it has a right to do." This proposition is a part of what Mr. Paine calls, a system of principles in opposition to those of Mr. Burke; and it is laid down without any sort of qualification. It is not my intention to defend the principles of Mr. Burke—Truth is the only object of my pursuit; and I shall without hesitation refuse my assent to every principle inconsistent with that, whether it proceeds from Mr. Burke, Mr. Paine, or even from the illustrious National Assembly of France. This principle, that a whole nation has a right to do whatever it pleases, cannot in any sense whatever be admitted as true. The eternal and immutable laws of justice and of morality, are paramount to all human legislation. The violation of those laws is certainly within the power, but it is not among the rights of nations. The power of a nation is the collected power of all the individuals which compose it. The rights of a nation are, in like manner, the collected rights of its individuals; and it must *follow* from thence, that the powers of a nation are more extensive than its rights, in the very same proportion with those of individuals. It is somewhat remarkable, that, in speaking of the exercise of the particular right of forming a Constitution, Mr. Paine himself denies to a nation that omnipotence which he had before so liberally bestowed. For this same nation, which has a right to do whatever it pleases, has no right to establish a government in *hereditary succession*. It is of infinite consequence that the distinction between *power* and *right* should be fully acknowledged, and ad-

mitted as one of the fundamental principles of Legislators. A whole nation, such as France, England, or America, can act only by representation; and the acts of the representative body must be considered as the acts of the nation. We must go farther, and say, that the acts of the majority in the Representative Assembly are the acts of the whole body, and consequently of the whole nation. If, therefore, a majority thus constituted, are bound by no law, human or divine, and have no other rule but their sovereign will and pleasure to direct them, what possible security can any citizen of the nation have for the protection of his unalienable rights? The principles of liberty must still be the sport of arbitrary power; and the hideous form of despotism must lay aside the diadem and the sceptre, only to assume the party-coloured garments of democracy.

The system of principles upon which Mr. Paine advances this assertion, is intended to prove, that the English nation have a right to destroy their present form of government, and to erect another. I am not disposed to deny this right, nor is it at present necessary to examine, whether Mr. Burke's opinions upon this subject are not directed rather against the expediency than the abstracted rights of such a measure. It may, however, not be improper to trace the origin of Mr. Paine's arguments against the principles maintained by Mr. Burke. Dr. Price had asserted, that by "the principles of the Revolution in 1688, the people of England had acquired the right, 1. To choose their own Governors; 2. To cashier them for misconduct; and 3. To frame a Government for themselves." Mr. Burke endeavours to prove,



that the principles of the Revolution in 1688, so far from warranting any right of this kind, support a doctrine almost diametrically opposite. Mr. Paine, in reply, cuts the Gordian knot at once, declares the Parliament of 1688 to have been downright usurpers; censures them for having unwisely sent to Holland for a King; denies the existence of the British Constitution; and invites the people of England to overturn their present Government, and to erect another upon the broad basis of national sovereignty, and government by representation.—As Mr. Paine has departed altogether from the principles of the Revolution, and has torn up by the roots all reasoning from the British Constitution, by the denial of its existence, it becomes necessary to examine his work upon the grounds which he has chosen to assume. If we judge of the production from its apparent tendency, we may call it an address to the English nation, attempting to prove that they have a right to form a new Constitution; that it is expedient for them immediately to exercise that right; and that, in the formation of this Constitution, they can do no better than to imitate the model set before them by the French National Assembly. However immethodical his production is, I believe the whole of its argumentative part may be referred to these three points. If the subject were to affect only the British nation, we might leave them to reason and act for themselves: but, Sir, these are concerns equally important to all mankind; and the citizens of America are called upon, from high authority, to rally round the *standard* of this champion of revolutions. I shall therefore now proceed to examine the reasons upon which he



found his opinions relative to each of these points.—

The people of England have, in common with every other nation, a natural and unalienable right to form a Constitution of Government, not because a whole nation has a right to do whatever it chooses to do, but because Government, being instituted for the common security of the natural rights of every individual, it must be liable to alterations whenever it becomes incompetent for that purpose. The right of a people to legislate for succeeding generations, derives all its authority from the consent of that posterity, who are bound by their laws; and therefore, the expressions of perpetuity used by the Parliament of 1688 contain no absurdity: and expressions of a similar nature may be found in all the Constitutions of the United States.

But, Sir, when this right is thus admitted in its fullest latitude, it must also be admitted that it ought never to be exercised but in cases of extreme urgency: Every nation has a right, as unquestionable, to dissolve the bands of civil society by which they are united, and to return to that state of individual imbecility in which man is supposed to have existed previous to the formation of the social compact. The people of America have been compelled by an unaccountable necessity, distressing in its operation, but glorious in its consequences, to exercise this right; and whenever a nation has no other alternative but the degradation of slavery, or the formidable conflict of a revolution, the generous spirit of freedom will not hesitate a moment in the choice. Whether the people of France were, at the period of their revo-

lution, reduced to that unhappy situation which rendered it absolutely necessary to overthrow their whole system to its foundations, is a question upon which the ablest patriots among themselves have differed, and upon which we are inadequate to decide. Whether the people of England are now in that calamitous predicament, is a question more proper for our discussion, and upon which I shall take the liberty to examine the reasoning of Mr. Paine.

PUBLICOLA.

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### LETTER III.

SIR,

IN examining the question, Whether the English nation have a right, fundamentally to demolish their present form of government? it becomes necessary to enquire, Whether Mr. Paine's assertion, that there is no such thing as an English Constitution, be really true? This question may perhaps, in some measure, affect the people of America. For if the government of Great Britain is an usurpation, it may be worthy of consideration, how far we are bound by treaties which do not reciprocally bind the inhabitants of that island?

"A Constitution," says Mr. Paine, "is not a thing in name only, but in fact. It has not an ideal, but a real existence; and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form, there is none."

Mr. Paine should have gone further, and told us, whether, like a deed, it must be written on paper or parchment; or whether it has a larger latitude, and may be engraved on stone, or carved in wood. From the tenor of his argument, it should seem that he had only the American Constitutions in his mind; for, excepting them, I believe he would not find in all history, a government which will come within his definition; and, of course, there never was a people that had a Constitution previous to the year 1776. But the word, with an idea affixed to it, had been in use, and commonly understood, for centuries before that period; and therefore Mr. Paine must, to suit his purpose, alter its acceptations, and, in the warmth of his zeal for revolutions, endeavour to bring about a revolution in language also. When all the most illustrious Whig writers in England have contended for the liberty of their country upon the principles of the French Constitution; when the glorious Congress of 1774 declared, that "the inhabitants of the English colonies in North America were entitled to certain rights by the immutable laws of nature, *the principles of the English Constitution*, and the several charters or compacts;" they knew very well what they meant, and were perfectly understood by all mankind. Mr. Paine says, that "a constitution is to a government, what the laws, made afterwards by that government, are to a court of judicature." But, when the American States, by their Constitutions, expressly adopted the whole body of the *common law*, so far as it was applicable to their respective situations, did they adopt nothing at all, because that law cannot be produced in a visible



form? No, Sir, the constitution of a country is not the paper or parchment upon which the compact is written, it is the system of fundamental laws by which the people have consented to be governed, which is always supposed to be impressed upon the mind of every individual, and of which the written or printed copies are nothing more than the evidence.

In this sense, Sir, the British nation have a Constitution, which was for many years the admiration of the world; the people of America, with very good reason, have renounced some of its defects and infirmities. But in defence of some of its principles they have fought and conquered. It is composed of a venerable *system* of unwritten or customary laws, handed down from time immemorial, and sanctioned by the accumulated experience of ages; and of a body of statutes, enacted by an authority lawfully competent to that purpose. Mr. Paine is certainly mistaken when he considers the British government as having originated in the conquest of William of Normandy. This principle of being governed by an oral or traditionary law prevailed in England eleven hundred years before that invasion. It has continued to this day, and has been adopted by all the American States. I hope they will never abolish a system so excellent, merely because it cannot be produced in a visible form. The constitution of Great Britain is a constitution of *principles*, not of *articles*; and however frequently it may have been violated by tyrants, monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical, the people have always found it expedient to restore the original foundations, while



from time to time they have been successful in improving and ornamenting the building.

The people of England are bound therefore by a social compact now existing ; and they have no right to demolish their government, unless it be clearly incompetent for the purposes for which it was instituted. They have delegated their whole collective power to a legislature, consisting of a King, Lords, and Commons, and they have included even the power of altering the Constitution itself. Should they abuse this power so, that the nation itself should be oppressed, and their rights to life, liberty, and property, instead of protection, should meet with tyranny, the people would certainly be entitled to appeal, in the last resort, to themselves, to resume the trust which has been so unworthily betrayed, and (not to do whatever they should choose, but) to form another Constitution, which should more permanently secure the natural rights of the whole community. The same may be said of the National Assembly of France, who, according to Mr. Paine's idea, are possessed of the whole collective power of the nation, and who seem, like him, to think they have a right to do whatever they choose. Mr. Paine says, that " the authority of the present Assembly is different to what the authority of future Assemblies will be." But if the present Assembly should decree, that all future National Assemblies should possess the same power with themselves, it would certainly be binding as an article of the Constitution. Mr. Paine, indeed, will not acknowledge this; and it is the second right which he denies his nation, which at the same time has a right to do every thing. Mr. Paine's ideas upon

this subject appear to have been formed by a partial adoption of the principle upon which Rousseau founds the social compact. But neither the principle of Rousseau nor that of Mr. Paine is true. Rousseau contends that the social compact is formed by a personal association of individuals, which must be unanimously assented to, and which cannot possibly be made by a representative body. I shall not at present spend much of my time in shewing that this is neither practicable, nor even metaphysically true. I shall only observe, that its operation would annihilate, in an instant, all the power of the National Assembly, and turn the whole body of the American Constitutions (the pride of man, the glory of the human understanding) into a mass of tyrannical and unfounded usurpations. Mr. Paine does not go quite so far; but we must examine whether his arguments are not equally wide from the truth. "A government," says he, "on the principles on which constitutional governments, arising out of Society, are established, cannot have the right of altering itself. Why not? Because if it had, it would be arbitrary." But this reason is not sufficient. A nation, in forming a social compact, may delegate the whole of their collective powers to ordinary legislatures, in perpetual succession, and reserve only the right of resisting the abuse of those powers; and every other question relative to the reservation of powers to the nation, must be only a question of expediency. The same power which the present National Assembly possess in France, is, by the English Constitution, constantly vested in the King and Parliament of Great Britain;

and the people in both kingdoms have the same right to resist and punish the abuse of that power.

Surely, Sir, the people of the United States have a Constitution, although they have given the power of making alterations, to those by whom it is administered, in conjunction with the State Legislatures. Surely, the people of Massachusetts have a Constitution, though it provides for certain alterations by the ordinary Legislatures, and though since it was formed, such alterations have accordingly been made. The Constitutions of several of the United States, are expressly made alterable in every part by their ordinary Legislatures. I think there is not one of them, but admits of alterations without recurring to "the nation in its original character." Yet Mr. Paine will surely acknowledge that the American Constitutions arose out of the people and not over them. His principle therefore "that a Constitutional Government cannot have the right of altering itself" is not true. In forming their Constitution, a nation may reserve to themselves such powers as they think proper. They may reserve only the unalienable right of resistance against tyranny. The people of England have reserved only this right. The French National Assembly have been in session more than two years, to make laws nominally paramount to their future legislatures. I shall hazard some observations upon this subject, when I attempt to follow Mr. Paine, through his comparison between the French and English Constitutions. But as the English have delegated all their power, I contend they have no right in their original character to change their form of Government, unless it has become incompetent for the purposes, for which



all Governments are instituted. I am aware of the question which will occur here.—Who is to judge of this incompetency ; and I am aware of the triumphant manner in which it may be asked. But a triumph is not my object, and in the pursuit of truth I shall venture in my next number to consider this subject.

PUBLICOLA,

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## LETTER IV.

SIR,

I HAVE assumed for a principle, that the English nation, having delegated all their collective power have no right in their original character, to change their form of Government, unless it has become absolutely inadequate to the purposes for which it was instituted. The people themselves, must from the necessity of the case be the judges of this fact: but if in forming this judgment, and acting in pursuance of it, they proceed from passion and not from principle, if they dissolve their compact from an idea that “they have a right to do whatever they choose,” and break the bands of society, in the forms of despotism, “because such is their pleasure,” they may indeed go through the operation by the plenitude of their irresistible power, but the nation will meet with ample punishment in their own misery, and the leaders who delude them, in the detestation of their own posterity. It is not by adopting the malignity of a political



satyrift, by converting the fallies of wit into the maxims of truth or juftice, or by magnifying trivial imperfections into capital crimes, that a nation will be juftified in reforting to its original ftrength, to contend againft its delegated power. It is not a mechanical horror againft the name of a king, or of ariftocracy, nor a physical antipathy to the found of an extravagant title, or to the fight of an innocent ribband, that can authorife a people to lay violent hands upon the Conftitution which protects their rights, and guards their liberties. They muft feel an actual deprivation of their equal rights, and fee an actual impoffibility for their reftoration in any other manner, before they can have a right to lay their hands on their fwords, and appeal to Heaven. Thefe are not the principles of flavery ; they are the tenets of the only genuine liberty ; which confifts in a mean equally diftant from the defpotifm of an individual, as of a million. They are fanned by our own uniform example, and will, I truft, never be departed from by the moft enlightened, and moft virtuous people on the globe. For fixteen years the people of America endured a continual fucceffion of every indignity, which the pride of dominion, the infolence of power, and the rapacity of avarice, could inflict upon them, before they could refolve to renounce an authority, three thoufand miles diftant from them ; and even then, they were fo far from thinking they had a right to do whatever they chofe ; that by the very act, which renounced their connection with Great Britain they expofed to the world their own fufferings, and the various acts of tyranny, which had compelled them to “ acquiefce in the neceffity which

denounced the separation," and, " appealed to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of their intentions." No, Sir, the venerable character who drew up this declaration never could believe that the rights of a nation, have no other limits, than its powers.—Since the Revolution, the people of the United States, have again been compelled to form a national Government, and in its formation proceeded in the same spirit. The confederation was found totally incompetent for the purposes for which it was instituted ; not from an abuse of the delegated powers, in those by whom it was administered, but because scarcely any powers at all had been given. The inefficiency of that system had long been fully demonstrated, and had reduced us to extreme distress. The States united but in name, were upon the verge of general bankruptcy. Their credit sunk to the lowest ebb, was upon the point of expiring, and their exhausted treasury, gave perpetually the lie to their public faith, so often and so solemnly pledged. The forcible ties of a common interest, directed to one great object during the war, were greatly loosened by the accomplishment of that object, and the seeds of mutual hostility were sown, by the partial commercial regulations of the respective states. The revenue laws which had been enacted in several of the states, were not able to support their credit, and yet were so unequal in their operation, that numerous bodies of men, in more than one of the states, appeared in open rebellion against the mildest Governments that ever were instituted. Instead of the glorious reward which the people had expected for their virtuous exertions, internal discord, and infamy abroad presented

themselves in dreary perspective before them. At that critical period, when the system to be annihilated, was an empty name, and there was only a Government to be formed, the national Constitution was presented to the people of America "in their original character," and even then its existence was to depend upon the assent of nine states, that is two thirds of the people. Very fortunately it has at length been freely adopted by all the members of the Union; but the extreme difficulty which impeded the progress of its adoption, and the various amendments, which in many of the states, were in a manner made the condition of their assent, exhibit the fullest evidence, what a more than Herculean task it is, to unite the opinions of a free people, upon any system of government whatever.

Under the sanction of such authority, I venture to assert, that the people of England have no right to destroy their government, unless in its operation the rights of the people are really oppressed, and unless they have attempted in vain every constitutional mode of obtaining redress. These principles ought to operate with peculiar force upon the people of England; because, in the uncertain and hazardous event of a Revolution, they have more to lose, and less to gain, than any other European nation; and because whatever they acquire must in all probability be purchased at the expence of a civil war. When provision is made for the alteration of a constitution, otherwise than by the common legislative power, it may be done comparatively without difficulty or danger; but where this power is already delegated, with the other powers of legislation, the people cannot use it



themselves, except in their original, individual, unrepresented character; and they cannot acquire the right to act in that capacity, until the power which they have thus conveyed in trust has been abdicated by the extreme abuses of its administration.

When Mr. Paine invited the people of England to destroy their present Government, and form another Constitution, he should have given them sober reasoning, and not flippant witticisms. He should have explained to them the nature of the grievances by which they are oppressed, and demonstrated the impossibility of reforming the Government in its present organization. He should have pointed out to them some possible method for them to act in their original character, without a total dissolution of civil society among them; he should have proved what great advantages they would reap, as a nation, from such a revolution, without disguising the great dangers and formidable difficulties with which it must be attended.

The principal and most dangerous abuses in the English Government, arise less from the defects inherent in the Constitution, than from the state of society; the universal venality and corruption which pervades all classes of men in that kingdom, and which a change of government could not reform. I shall consider this subject more largely hereafter; but at present, with respect to the expediency of a revolution in England, I must inquire how the nation can be brought to act in their original character? Mr. Paine, perhaps from the delicacy of his situation, has said nothing openly upon this very important point. Yet, in two different parts of his work, he seems obscure-

ly to hint two methods for the accomplishment of this object. When he compares the situation of the citizens of London to that of the inhabitants of Paris just before the taking of the Bastile, it seems as if it was with an intention to recommend a similar insurrection for the purpose of dispersing the Parliament, and expelling the King, which would leave the nation without any government at all, and compel them at all events to act in their original character. When he advises "Revolutions by accommodation," he must probably mean that a convention should be called by act of Parliament to regenerate their Constitution. I cannot imagine any other method of answering his purpose. Mr. Paine seems to think it is as easy for a nation to change its government, as for a man to change his coat; but, I confess, both the modes of proceeding which he suggests, appear to me to be liable to great objections.

PUBLICOLA:

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## LETTER V.

SIR,

"THERE are in all European countries," says Mr. Paine, "a large class of people of that description, which in England are called the *mob*." It was by the people of this description that the Bastile in Paris was destroyed. In London there

is no Bastile to demolish ; but there is a government to overturn ; and there is a King and Parliament, who must either be put to flight, or compelled to call a convention for the purpose of forming a constitution. “ In the commencement of a Revolution, those men are rather the followers of the *camp* than of the *standard* of liberty, and have yet to be instructed how to reverence it.” As these men were made instrumental to the accomplishment of the Revolution in France, Mr. Paine appears to intimate, that they may be employed for a similar purpose in England.—I am as little disposed as Mr. Paine can be, to reproach either the whole nation to which they belong, or that unhappy class of human beings themselves, for the devastation which they commit. They cannot be considered as free agents, and therefore are neither the subjects of praise or blame ; but the friend of humanity will be extremely cautious how he ventures to put in action a tremendous power, which is competent only to the purposes of destruction, and totally incapable either to create or to preserve. This class of men, of whom it is the happiness of Americans scarcely to be able to form an idea, can be brought to act in concert upon no other principles than those of a frantic enthusiasm and ungovernable fury ; their profound ignorance and deplorable credulity make them proper tools for any man who can inflame their passions, or alarm their superstition ; and as they have nothing to lose by the total dissolution of civil society, their rage may be easily directed against any victim which may be pointed out to them. They are altogether incapable of forming a rational judgment, either upon the principles or the motives of their



own conduct; and whether the object for which they are made to contend be good or bad, the brutal arm of power is all the assistance they can afford for its accomplishment. To set in motion this inert mass, the eccentric vivacity of a mad-man is infinitely better calculated than the sober coolness of phlegmatic reason. They need only to be provoked and irritated, and they never can in any other manner be called into action. In the year 1780, they assembled at London, to the number of 60,000, under the direction of Lord George Gordon, and carrying fire and slaughter before them, were upon the point of giving the whole city of London to one undistinguished devastation and destruction; and this, because the Parliament had mitigated the severity of a sanguinary and tyrannical law of persecution against the Roman Catholics. Should these people be taught that they have a right to do every thing, and that the titles of Kings and Nobles, and the wealth of Bishops, are all usurpations and robberies committed upon them, I believe it would not be difficult to rouse their passions, and to prepare them for every work of ruin and destruction. But, Sir, when they are once put in motion, they soon get beyond all restraint and controul. The rights of man to life, liberty, and property, oppose but a feeble barrier to them; the beauteous face of nature, and the elegant refinements of art, the hoary head of wisdom, and the enchanting smile of beauty, are all equally liable to become obnoxious to them; and as all their power consists in destruction, whatever meets with their displeasure must be devoted to ruin. Could any thing but an imperious, over-ruling necessity, justify any man or

body of men, for using a weapon like this to operate a Revolution in Government? Such, indeed, was the situation of the French National Assembly, when they directed the electric fluid of this popular frenzy against the ancient fabric of their monarchy. They justly thought that no price could purchase too dearly the fall of arbitrary power in an individual; but perhaps even *they* were not aware of all the consequences which might follow from committing the existence of the kingdom to the custody of a lawless and desperate rabble.

But do the people of England labour under such intolerable oppression as would authorize any of their patriots to employ an arm like this for their relief? Suppose sixty thousand men should again assemble round Westminster-hall, and with clubs and fire-brands for their sole arguments, should compel the Parliament to call a convention to make a Constitution, what would be the probable consequences? Is it clear that so large a majority of the people of England have lost all their attachment to their Constitution, as to insure an acquiescence in the measure throughout the kingdom? Is it certain that one quarter part of the people would obey an act extorted by such violence as that? Would not all the friends of the present Government rally round the standard of the Constitution, and would not their duty compel them to defend it with their lives and fortunes? If it should soon appear that they were decidedly the strongest party, would not the insurrection be extinguished in the blood of its leaders? If the parties should prove to be nearly equal, would not the nation be involved in all the horrors of a long and bloody civil war?—In whatever point of view the effects of

this scheme are contemplated, they present nothing but prospects at which every friend of mankind must shudder ; nor can I possibly believe that Mr. Paine, who is certainly a benevolent man, would deliberately recommend this method, though in his ardent zeal for the honour of the French nation, and the propagation of their doctrine, he has incautiously suggested it.

But he recommends Revolutions by accommodation ; which, applied to England, must mean, that a convention be called by a free and deliberate act of Parliament, to alter the Constitution ; but this plan appears to be equally dangerous with the other, and more impracticable ; while by a singular fatality an act of this kind would be the completest evidence of its own inutility, it would be equally dangerous ; because, by a formal act of competent authority, it would expose the kingdom to all the evils of anarchy and of war, which in the other case would result from a popular convulsion. It would be less practicable, because it is contrary to nature, that any body of men should venture to perform the most transcendant act of power of which human beings are capable, for the single purpose of divesting themselves of all power whatever. It would prove its own inutility ; because no man will presume that they ought to take such a measure, unless the wishes of a clear and decided majority of the people are favourable to an alteration of the Government. If they are disposed to act in conformity with the desires of the people, the very same power which would authorise them to dissolve the Government, would likewise justify them in making any alterations which should meet with the wishes of the nation, and would render



a recurrence to them, "in their original character," perfectly unnecessary.

Whatever Mr. Paine's opinion may be with respect to the existence of an English Constitution, it is certain that every member of the British Parliament, who gives his vote in the making of a new law, or the alteration of an old one, must suppose that he acts by virtue of a Constitutional right vested in him; but the same right which authorises him to give his suffrage on the most trifling object of legislation, has vested in the Parliament of which he is a member, the whole power of the British nation, and he cannot possibly deny their right, without utterly destroying his own. The right of the individual depends altogether upon the right of the corporation, and his right to vote for the regulation of a turnpike, or the toll of a bridge, is the same with theirs to make every necessary and convenient alteration in the Constitution of the kingdom itself. While they are thus convinced of their right to exercise these great powers, would it not be the summit of extravagance, and folly in them; nay, would it not be the most flagrant breach of the trust reposed in them, of which they could possibly be guilty, to abdicate an authority lawfully committed to them, to declare themselves altogether incompetent to a wise and prudent use of a Constitutional power, and to commit the peace, the welfare, the very existence of the nation, to the uncertain and hazardous event of a Revolution?

If, however, we can suppose that the Parliament should finally accede to the idea, that they are mere tyrants, without the shadow of a right to the authority which they have hitherto exercised, the

only act which they could agree to would be a vote to dissolve themselves, and leave the vessel of the state without either a pilot or a rudder. For the very act of calling a convention would be an usurpation, and from the importance of its consequences, an usurpation of the most daring nature: It would be assuming the right to dissolve the ties of society, and at the same instant acknowledging that this assumed right was without any sort of foundation. In short, this plan of calling a convention to alter the Constitution by act of Parliament, appears to me, in whatever light it is considered, to involve an absurdity.

But, as there is unquestionably somewhere in England, a combination of the right and of the power to alter the constitution of the country, and as that Constitution is indubitably liable to be improved, we may be permitted to inquire, whether a blind imitation of the French National Assembly would probably promote the happiness of the people; the only object for which all governments were instituted, or which can authorise their alteration.

#### PUBLICOLA.

## LETTER VI.

SIR,

MR. PAINE affirms, that the French nation have a Constitution, and that the English have none. I have already offered a few observations upon the latter part of this assertion; but as a preliminary to some remarks, which I propose to make upon his comparison, I must premise, that directly the reverse of his opinion upon this subject is the truth, and that in reality the English nation have a Constitution, and the French as yet have none. The National Assembly have indeed been constantly sitting these two years, to form a Constitution; and at the ceremony of the Federation, about eleven months since, they swore themselves and their King to the observance of a Constitution *to be made*. But as they are still possessed of the whole power of the nation, they may repeal any article upon which they have hitherto agreed, by virtue of the same authority which enabled them to pass the decree; and therefore, according to Mr. Paine's own ideas, the French cannot be said to have a Constitution, until the National Assembly shall please to dissolve themselves, and to put their whole system into full operation.

I have endeavoured to shew, that it is not absolutely essential to the existence of a Constitution, that it should be producible "in a visible form." The period of time when the foundations of the present English government were laid, by the as-



fociation of the people in "their original character," cannot indeed be ascertained. Many of the laws which are in use to this day in Great Britain, and from thence have been adopted by the American Republics, may be traced back to the remotest period of antiquity; and the origin even of the institution of Juries, an institution so congenial to the genuine spirit of freedom, is lost in the obscurity of the fabulous ages. Many of the fundamental principles of the English Constitution are known to have existed long before the invention of printing, and even before the inhabitants of Britain were acquainted with the use of letters; and it would therefore be an absurdity to require that the original articles should be produced "in a visible form." But, "*ex nihilo nihil fit*," the very existence of these principles proves the formation of a social compact previous to that existence; and the spirit of liberty, which is their distinguishing characteristic, affords internal evidence, that they did not originate in the merciless despotism of a conqueror, but in the free and unrestrained consent of a manly and generous people. It will not be said that an original compact was never formed, because it is not recorded in the page of history; as well might it be pretended that the pyramids of Egypt arose self-created from the earth, because the time of their erection, and the names of their builders, have been consigned to that oblivion, in which all human labours are destined to be overwhelmed.

William of Normandy, to whom Mr. Paine always refers the origin of the English government, was the conqueror only of Harold. He obtained the crown of England by popular election, upon

the express condition that he would govern the nation according to her ancient laws and customs; he took the same oath at his coronation which had been taken by his predecessors; and by his last will, after bequeathing the province of Normandy to his eldest son Robert, he expressly acknowledged that he did not possess the kingdom of England as an inheritance, and only recommended his son William as his successor. It would be altogether unnecessary at this time to discuss the question, whether the crown of England was originally hereditary or elective; but the facts which I have here stated, and which are warranted by all the most ancient and most authentic English historians, fully demonstrate that the English government did not originate in the Norman conquest. "If the succession runs in the line of the conquest, *the nation*, runs in the line of being conquered, and it ought to rescue itself from this reproach," says Mr. Paine. "The victory obtained at Hastings not being a victory over *the nation collectively*, but only over the person of Harold, the only right that the conqueror could pretend to acquire thereby, was the right to possess the crown of England, not *to alter the nature of the Government*" says Judge Blackstone (1 Comm. 199). Upon a question of fact relative to the English Constitution, Blackstone is, I believe, as good an authority as Mr. Paine; but I wish not to rest the question upon any authority whatever: I venture to affirm, that any man who will coolly and impartially examine the subject, and appeal to the original sources of information, will acknowledge, that those who derive the origin of the English Government from William the Conqueror, can do it

upon no other principle than that of supporting a system.

It is not however necessary upon the present occasion to revive a question, which has been discussed among the English with all the acrimony of faction. Mr. Paine has chosen the ground, which was not found tenable by the slavish supporters of passive obedience and the divine right of Kings. They took it originally, because it was necessary to them for the support of their system, and they were driven from it, by the friends and supporters of equal liberty. Mr. Paine found it necessary to support a doctrine of a very different nature; and, adopting the maxim that it is lawful to learn, even from our enemies, he has freely borrowed from them the practice of accommodating the facts of history to his political purposes.

Be that however as it may, the Parliament of Great Britain, from time to time, have enacted certain laws, which, from their superior importance, have been denominated Constitutional; the acquiescence of the people, to whom most of those laws have been extremely satisfactory, gives them at least as good a sanction as the Constitution of France has obtained. The National Assembly were not originally chosen to form a Constitution. They were called together as States-General, under the authority of another Constitution, such as it was. They assumed the power to dissolve the old Constitution, and to form another; and the acquiescence of the people has confirmed that assumption. At all events, therefore, their Constitution stands upon no better ground than the acts of the British Parliament.



If then the Parliament of Great Britain have a right to declare what shall be the supreme law of the land, they will be able to produce a system of Constitutional law, even according to Mr. Paine's wish, "in a visible form." This system is contained in a number of statutes, enacted not at one time, or by one body of men, but at divers times, according to the occasional convenience of the people, and by a competent authority. These statutes contain the principles upon which the English government is founded, and are therefore proper objects of comparison with the Constitution which is to be the supreme law of the land in France. The comparisons which Mr. Paine has drawn, are not partially favourable to his native country. We shall inquire whether they are perfectly consistent with truth.

PUBLICOLA.

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## LETTER VII.

SIR,

BY the English Constitution, the whole collective power of the nation is delegated, and the Constitution itself is alterable by the same authority which is competent to the common purposes of legislation.

The French are to have a constitution, every part of which will be nominally beyond the controul of their common legislatures, and which will

be unalterable in all parts, except by the nation in its "original character." At least Mr. Paine has undertaken to answer for them that it will be so : Although I have not seen any such article in the Constitution, and though perhaps it has not yet been decreed, I am willing to take Mr. Paine's word for the fact, and to consider the subject as it were already determined.

I have made some observations upon Mr. Paine's arguments, as they respect the right of a nation to delegate all their power. As a question of expediency, it may perhaps be more difficult to determine which of these two schemes contains the least evil. Both of them are supported by the example of several among the American States, and can therefore boast the sanction of authorities equally respectable.

The fundamental principle upon which society is formed, appears to be, in order that the power of the whole may be rendered subservient to the interests of the whole. The problem to solve is, in what manner the power shall be distributed, so as most effectually to answer that purpose? Considering the extreme difficulty with which a whole nation can be brought to act in their original character, it should seem that wisdom must dictate to them the necessity of delegating their whole power, in such a manner as that it may be rendered beneficial to the nation, because whatever power is retained by the people, cannot be exercised for their advantage, any more than to their injury. The question therefore occurs, why a nation should not delegate all its powers? Mr. Paine has bestowed very little consideration upon this subject ; I find that although he gives his own opinion very

freely, he offers only two reasons to support it. One, because "such a Government would be arbitrary:" The other, because "there is a paradox in the idea of vitiated bodies reforming themselves." In the sense in which the word arbitrary is here used, the first argument attacks the foundation of civil society itself; for whenever a number of individuals associate together and form themselves into a body politic, called a nation, the possession and the use of the whole power (which is not however arbitrary power), is the very object of their association. This power must exist somewhere, and I cannot see the reason why it should not exist for the benefit of the people.—But whenever a Constitution is made unalterable by the common legislative authority, the nation do in reality abdicate all the powers which they are said to retain, and declare that very important powers shall at all events be useless to them, from an apprehension that they might possibly be abused to their injury.—It is as if a man should bind himself never to wear a sword, lest he should turn it against his own breast.—The only reason why the whole power of a nation should not be delegated, must arise from the danger of its being abused: And a melancholy experience has always shewn, that when the whole power has been thus delegated to one man, or to one body of men, it has invariably been grossly abused, and the sword of the people has been turned into a dagger against them. From the pressure of those evils, many nations have been induced expressly to forbid their governments the use of certain powers, without considering that the impotence of their supreme authority, would certainly be very prejudicial to



them, and perhaps as fatal as the abuse of power. This experiment has repeatedly been made ; it has frequently failed : and I believe that after several more experiments shall fully demonstrate the ill policies of thus annihilating the powers of the nation, it will be clearly seen, that all the powers of the people ought to be delegated for their benefit, and that their true interest consists in the distribution of those powers in such a manner as shall, in its own operation, guard against the abuses which alone are dangerous to the people.

The Constitution of the United States appears to me to unite all the advantages both of the French and of the English, while it has avoided the evils of both. By that Constitution, the people have delegated the power of alteration, by vesting it in the Congress, together with the State Legislatures ; while at the same time it has provided for alterations by the people themselves in their original character, whenever it shall evidently appear to be the wish of the people to make them. This article appears to be replete with wisdom ; I believe it will stand the test of the severest examination, though according to the ideas emanating from Mr. Paine, and coming to us at the same time by reflection from the Secretary of State, it contains a very dangerous political heresy.

It is a maxim which will not I trust be disputed, that no Government of which the people is not a constituent part, can secure their equal rights ; but where this is the case, to cramp the operations of their own Government, with unnecessary restrictions, and forbid themselves to enact useful laws, what is it but to defeat the purposes of society, by the very act which gives it a permanent

existence ; to tie their own hands from an imaginary apprehension that if left at liberty they would administer poison to the body which nourishes them.

It is in the distribution of the national powers, it is in the independent spirit of the people, and not in the manuscript limitations of the legislative authority, that a nation is to secure the protection of its liberties. In this commonwealth we have a Constitution, most parts of which are unalterable by our ordinary legislatures ; it has existed but ten years : and already its operation has convinced us all that several alterations in the system would be highly expedient.—Our legislative body would be fully competent to the purpose, and, if they had the power, would readily make such alterations as might suit the convenience of the people ; but they have no authority to act in these cases for the benefit of the people ; and as the inconveniences to which this injudicious jealousy have subjected us, are not at this time of such importance as to render the alterations of immediate or absolute necessity, we must wait our appointed time, and patiently submit to the operation of bad laws, because we have not chosen to invest our Legislature with the power of making good ones. Let us not be frightened, however, from the pursuit of our common interest by the words arbitrary power. Distribute the whole of your power in such a manner, as will necessarily prevent any one man, or body of men, or any possible combination of individual interests, from being arbitrary, but do not incumber your own representatives with shackles, prejudicial to your own interests ; nor suffer yourselves, like the Spanish Monarch, of ri-

diculous memory, to be roasted to death, by denying to your servants the power of removing the fire from before you.

But although a Constitution, professedly unalterable by the common legislative authority, is of weight sufficient to prevent the enacting of many good laws, yet it will not always operate as a check upon your legislature. Such is the poverty of all human labours, that even a whole nation cannot express themselves upon paper with so much accuracy and precision, as not to admit of much latitude of explanation and construction. The legislature must always be allowed to judge of the intentions with which the instrument was formed, and to construe and explain accordingly the expressions which it contains. They sometimes think proper to violate the letter of the Constitution, by adhering to its spirit; and at other times they sacrifice the spirit, by adhering strictly to the letter. But when your Legislature undertakes to decide, that the spirit of the Constitution is directly contrary to its express letter, where is the power in the nation that should controul them? The same power, which will always be sufficient to controul a Legislature, of which the people are a constituent part; it is the spirit of the people.—Let your legislative and executive authorities be so constituted, as to prevent every essential or dangerous abuse of the powers delegated, but depend upon the honest and enlightened spirit of the people for a security which you never will obtain, by merely withholding your powers, unless that spirit should be constantly kept up. Divide your power so that every part of it may at all times be used for your advantage, but in such a manner, that your rights



may never depend upon the will of any one man or body of men ; entrust even the power of altering your Constitution itself, because occasions may arise, when the use even of that power may be absolutely necessary for your own welfare, when, at the same time, it may be impossible for you to act in your original character with the expedition necessary for your salvation ; but reserve to yourselves a concurrent power of altering the Constitution in your own persons ; because, by the decay to which all the works of man are liable, it is possible that your legislature may become incompetent to make such alterations as may be necessary. But when the people are constantly represented in the legislature, I believe they will never find it necessary to recur to their original character, in order to make any alterations which they may deem expedient, unless they deny the power of making them to their legislature.

“ But,” says Mr. Paine, “ there is a paradox in the idea of vitiated bodies reforming themselves.” This must depend altogether upon the coincidence of the part vitiated, with the part which is to apply the remedy ; for unless the defect itself necessarily precludes the possibility of applying the power of reformation, the paradox ceases, and no more involves an absurdity, than that a physician should use his own prescriptions to cure himself of a disorder.

The very act by which septennial Parliaments were established in England, affords sufficient proof that the power of altering the Constitution itself ought to be delegated, and even exercised by the Government upon certain critical occasions. That act was made at a time when the kingdom was

threatened with an immediate invasion, when a rebellion had but just been quelled, and when the peace and safety of the nation depended upon the use of this power by the Parliament; such was the opinion of the people at that time, and the act met with general approbation, from the general conviction of its necessity. Such occasions may happen in the history of every free people; and it is therefore proper that the power should be delegated. Upon the principles of equal liberty, upon the principles of public happiness, and therefore of political expedience, I think it may be fairly concluded, that Mr. Paine's preference of the French to the English Constitution, so far as it relates to this article, is not founded in truth.

PUBLICOLA.

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## LETTER VIII.

SIR,

MR. Paine has undertaken to compare the English and French Constitutions, upon the article of representation. He has of course admired the latter, and censured the former. This is unquestionably the most defective part of the English Constitution—but even the most essential of those defects appear to flow from the natural order of things, which a revolution in Government could not reform; from a state of society, when every

principle of religion or of morality has lost its influence, and where the only shadow of virtue, public or private, remaining among a great majority of the people, is founded upon an imaginary point of honour, the relict of the exploded age of chivalry. Such at present is the situation of the national character, both in England and in France. To attempt to govern a nation like this, under the form of a democracy, to pretend to establish over such beings a government, which, according to Rousseau, is calculated only for a republic of Gods, and which requires the continual exercise of virtues beyond the reach of human infirmity, even in its best estate: It may possibly be among the dreams of Mr. Paine, but it is what even the National Assembly have not ventured to do; their system will avoid some of the defects which the decays of time and the mutability of human affairs have introduced into that of the English; but I do not hesitate to affirm, that they have departed much further from the essential principles of popular representation, and that however their attachment to republican principles may have been celebrated, the *theory* of their National Assembly is more remote from the spirit of democracy than the practice of the English House of Commons.

The grounds upon which Mr. Paine acknowledges his approbation of the French constitution, are, that they have limited the number of their representatives in proportion to the number of citizens who pay a tax of sixty sous *per annum*, and the duration of the Assembly to two years. It is certainly essential to the principles of representation, that there should be a frequent recurrence to the constituent body for election, because



it is the only security of the constituent for the fidelity of the agent: It is the only practical responsibility by which the representative is bound. The term of seven years, for which the House of Commons is elected, weakens the responsibility too much, and is a proper object of constitutional reform; but by the French constitution, there is no responsibility at all; no connection between the representative and his constituent: the *people* have not, even once in seven years, an opportunity to dismiss a servant who may have displeased them, or to re-elect another who may have given them satisfaction. There is, upon the French system, less dependence of the representative upon his constituent than in England; and the mode of election renders the biennial return of the choice almost wholly nugatory. It is not true that the French constitution allows the privilege of voting for a representative in the National Assembly to every man who pays a tax of sixty sous *per annum*. Mr. Paine has mistaken the fact, for it is impossible that he should have intentionally misrepresented it; though it differs almost as much from his principles as from these of a real popular representation. It is as follows: Every Frenchman, born or naturalized, of 25 years of age, who pays a tax equal to three days labour, is not a hired servant, nor a bankrupt, nor the son of a deceased bankrupt (a very unjust qualification), shall be allowed to vote for—what? A representative to the National Assembly?—By no means. Yet one would think the exclusions sufficiently severe, for a government founded upon the equal rights of all men; but he shall vote for members of a certain Assembly. This Assembly

is allowed to choose, not the representatives of the nation, but another body of electors, who are to be the immediate constituents of the Legislative Assembly. Thus, the supreme Legislative Council of the nation are to be the representatives of a representative body, whose constituents are the representatives of the people; and at every stage of this complicated representation, the free citizens of the state are excluded from their natural rights, by additional qualifications in point of property. Yet this is the system which we are told is to abolish aristocracy.

In the formation of the Legislative body, the National Assembly contemplated three different objects of representation; the *persons* of the people, their *property*, and the *territory* which they inhabit. They have endeavoured to establish a proportion compounded from the three; but in the refinement of their metaphysics and mathematics, they have lost the primary object itself, and the people are not represented.

But setting aside their calculations, what is the *essential* principle upon which the representation of the people in the Legislature is grounded? It is, that a freeman shall never be bound by any law, unless he has consented to it. It is impossible, except in a very small state, that every individual should personally give his voice; and therefore this practice of voting by representation was invented. In its most perfect state, it cannot fully answer the purpose of its institution, because every representative is actuated by several powerful motives, which could not operate upon his constituents. It is an *artificial democracy*, which never can perform completely the functions of the natural de-

mocracy ; but imperfect as it always must be, no other contrivance has been hitherto devised, which could so effectually give their operation to the opinions of the people. In the theory of representation, it is a *personal* trust, by which a thousand individuals may authorise one man to express their sentiments upon every law which may be enacted for the benefit of the whole people : And therefore, in theory, every representative ought to be elected by the unanimous vote of his constituents ; for how can a man be said to have been consulted in the formation of a law, when the agent authorised to express his opinion was not the man of his choice ? Every pecuniary qualification imposed either on the electors, or as a condition of eligibility, is an additional restriction upon the natural democracy, and weakens the original purpose of the institution. Thus far the people of America have submitted to necessity in the constitution of their popular assemblies. But when the principle is abandoned so completely, that the individual citizen, even in the pretended exercise of his infinitesimal fragment of sovereignty, cannot possibly form an opinion, who will be the elector of the representative that is to be the depositary of his opinion in the acts of legislation. The assembly, thus formed, may indeed assume the name of a democracy ; but it will no more be entitled to that appellation, than an ill-drawn miniature portrait to that of the animated original which it may profess to represent.

It is obvious, that the reason why the National Assembly have chosen to refine their representation through so many strainers, was to avoid the violence, the tumults, the riots, which render al-



most all the populous towns in England a scene of war and blood at the period of Parliamentary elections. Time alone will inform us what the success of their system will be, even in this particular. Their elections, however, must be extremely expensive, and must open a thousand avenues to every sort of intrigue and venality. The National Assembly, as a body, will be in theory an aristocracy without responsibility. This aristocracy, thus constituted, are to possess the supreme power of the nation, limited only by a printed Constitution, subject to their own construction and explanation.

Happy, thrice happy the people of America! whose gentleness of manners, and habits of virtue, are still sufficient to reconcile the enjoyment of their natural rights with the peace and tranquillity of their country ;—whose principles of religious liberty did not result from an indiscriminate contempt of all religion whatever, and whose equal representation, in their legislative councils, was founded upon an equality really existing among them, and not upon the metaphysical speculations of fanciful politicians, vainly contending against the unalterable course of events, and the established order of nature.

PUBLICOLA.

FINIS.



